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Abstract
We analyze an oligopoly model in which diﬀerentiated criminal or-
ganizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local
corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are suﬃciently
well-paid, diﬃcult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable,
we show that increasing policing or sanctions eﬀectively deters crime.
However, when bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest
law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents
from criminal activity relative to legal activity are suﬃciently high, we
ﬁnd that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime
rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instru-
ments of deterrence, namely intensiﬁcation of policing and sanctions,
and the crime rate is nonmonotonic. Beyond a threshold, further in-
creases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized
crime extending corruption rings, and ensuing impunity results in a fall
of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime.
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11 Introduction
There are occasional examples of successful battles against the corruption per-
petrated by criminal organizations to inﬂuence law enforcement and politics.
For example, in 1931, right after prohibition of alcohol consumption ended in
the United States, the conviction of the notorious gang leader Al Capone for
tax evasion led to the break up of mobs and rackets built around the distri-
bution of alcohol, and other complementary activities. Yet, failed attempts to
curb the inﬂuence of organized crime are common place. Recently, in Italy,
the investigation mani pulite (clean hands) initiated by a courageous group of
judges disintegrated after disclosing pervasive corruption by the Maﬁa. This
eﬀort was halted by a string of assassinations inﬂicted upon law enforcers
and their families. In general, organized crime syndicates are very diﬃcult to
eliminate. They are able to protect themselves by a combination of means:
(i) corruption of law-enforcement oﬃcials; (ii) physical violence against in-
formants and witnesses; (iii) violent threats against prosecutors, judges and
members of juries; (iv) use of lawyers to manipulate the legal system; and (v)
ﬁnancial contributions to political campaigns.
The objective of this paper is to better understand the complex relationship
between organized crime, corruption and the eﬃciency of the justice system.
We will in fact focus on the evasion from conviction by criminal organiza-
tions through bribing law enforcers. However, the relevance of our ﬁndings
is not conﬁned to the inﬂuence on the operation of the legal system exerted
through this channel. As long as organized crime can invest to manipulate
the incentives faced by the actors involved in making prosecution possible, our
results regarding the limited eﬀectiveness of typical crime deterrents in weak
governance environments hold.
Criminal gangs are active and strategic in their eﬀorts to bribe policemen.
Cooperative police oﬃcers are helpful to criminal gangs by passing informa-
tion to them about police investigations and planned raids, and by making
deliberate ‘mistakes’ in prosecutions. Such technical errors then ensure that
the charges against the criminals will not result in guilty verdicts. Corruption
of police oﬃcers is made easier by the fact that they are modestly paid and,
therefore, are subject to temptation. Moreover, like prosecutors and members
of juries, law enforcers can be coerced through violence. Also, once a few po-
2licemen have been corrupted, they will make strong eﬀorts to ensure that their
colleagues are also corrupted. An honest policeman who tries to inform on his
corrupt colleagues will come under the most severe pressures from them.
The economics literature on crime has emphasized the deterrence capacity
of the justice system (e.g. Becker 1968, Ehrlich, 1973, Levitt, 1998). Recent
evidence for the United States tends to support the hypothesis that the ex-
pectations of potential criminals with respect to punishment determine crime
rates (see e.g. Levitt, 1997). Yet, expected punishment depends not only on
the severity of sentences but also on the probability of conviction once crime
is perpetrated. The latter depends on detection by the police, prosecution by
attorneys and the deliberation of judges and juries. As long as these three ac-
tivities are conducted transparently and eﬃciently, tough sanctions will deliver
deterrence of criminal activity.1 However if, as described above, corruption is
pervasive, then the deterrence capacity of rises in intended expected punish-
ment can be very much reduced due to ﬂawed law enforcement.
Since Becker and Stigler (1974) ﬁrst acknowledged that malfeasance by en-
forcers can diminish the eﬀectiveness of laws and sanctions in controlling crime,
the literature on crime has considered the problem of bribed oﬃcials. Becker
and Stigler propose the payment of eﬃciency wages to prevent bribe taking.2
Besley and McLaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) also propose wage
regimes to mitigate the moral hazard problem when rent seekers attempt to
co-opt law enforcers. Like Becker and Stigler (1974), Bowles and Garoupa
(1997) consider a model in which bribery reduces punishment and thus deter-
rence. However, their focus is diﬀerent since it is on the eﬀects of bribery on
the optimal allocation of resources (which incorporates the social costs of both
crime and corruption) within the public enforcement agency. They show that
the maximal ﬁne may not be optimal. Chang et al. (2000) extend Bowles and
Garoupa (1997) by introducing social stigma costs for caught corrupt oﬃcers.
They show that, when corruption is widespread, social norms cannot generate
as u ﬃcient sanction to deter corrupt oﬃcers, and raising ﬁnes can in fact result
1It is also well-known that, when expected detection is itself endogenous and negatively
depends on the number of criminals, multiple equilibria in crime and deterrence may emerge
(see for instance Fender, 1999, or Sah, 1991).
2For a comprehensive survey on law enforcement, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000). Also,
for a general survey on corruption and development, see Bardhan (1997).
3in more crime. Another extension of Bowles and Garoupa (1997) is done by
Garoupa and Jellal (2002). They consider the role of asymmetric information
on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. They show
that asymmetric information about the private costs of enforcers engaging in
collusion might eventually deter corruption and bargaining between the two
parties. Finally, Basu et al. (1992) argue that when the possibility of collusion
between law enforcing agents and criminals is introduced, control of corruption
becomes more diﬃcult than is suggested by the standard Beckerian approach.
Marjit and Shi (1998) extend this paper and show that controlling crime be-
comes diﬃcult, if not impossible, because the probability of detection can be
aﬀected by the eﬀort of a corrupt oﬃcial. Finally, in a recent paper Polinsky
and Shavell (2001) consider the dilution of deterrence caused by corruption
not only due to bribing by criminals but also extortion of the innocent by
crooked enforcers. They propose rewards for corruption reports to mitigate
the breakdown of deterrence. Our approach contributes to the literature in
that we focus on the relationship between organized crime,3 corruption of law
enforcers and punishment of criminals in the context of imperfect competition.
Hence, we ﬁnd not only a reduction in deterrence eﬀectiveness due to corrup-
tion as in previous models but actually a potential reversal whereby policies
usually identiﬁed as crime deterrents can instead become inducements as long
as bribery remains unchecked.
To be more precise, in the present paper, we analyze the role of corruption
not only in diluting deterrence but also as a strategic complement to crime and
therefore a catalyst to organized crime. For that, we develop a simple oligopoly
model in which n criminal organizations compete with each other on the lev-
els of both criminal activities and corruption. We ﬁrst show that when the
cost of bribing judges or the number of criminal organizations increases, then
both crime and corruption decrease whereas when the proﬁtability of crime
increases, then both crime and corruption increase. We then show our main
results. If corruption is costly, due to law enforcers being well-paid, hard to
bribe and easily detected when accepting side payments, relative to the prof-
its from crime, then, as predicted by the standard literature on crime, it is
always eﬀective to reduce crime by intensifying policing or toughening sanc-
3There is a small theoretical literature on organized crime (without corruption). See in
particular Fiorentini and Peltzman (1996), Garoupa (2000) and Mansour et al. (2000).
4tions. However, in the reverse case of low-paid dishonest law enforcers under
weak governance and sizable rents from illegal activity relative to the outside
lawful options, increasing policing or sanctions may in some cases generate
higher crime rates.
This last result is fairly intuitive. As long as the return to legal economic
activity is suﬃciently low relative to rents from crime, gangs continue pursing
crime. When sanctions and policing are toughened, the cost of hiring crimi-
nals rises as there is a wage premium to compensate for the risk of conviction
if apprehended. This will discourage crime but only up to a point. In par-
ticular, if bribing costs are small relative to the rents from crime, there is a
level of expected punishment beyond which further intended deterrence will
induce increasingly higher levels of corruption, and of actual crime. Indeed,
when governance is weak, harsher punishment can be a catalyst for organized
crime and may lead to concentration of criminal rents and higher rates of re-
turn ex post. For example, in the 1920’s during alcohol prohibition in the
United States, mob activities were so proﬁtable that organized crime could
aﬀo r dt ok e e pi ni t sp a y r o l lg o v e r n m e n to ﬃcials at various levels, including
elected politicians and law enforcers, to inﬂuence the legal system in its favor.
With imperfect competition, the potential eﬀectiveness of traditional deter-
rence policies to stop organized crime and other subsidiary illegal activities
is limited. This does not imply that tough sanctioning of crime and policing
should be abandoned altogether when institutional checks and balances are
underdeveloped. But, rather that unless corruption is curbed, traditional de-
terrence measures can have the perverse eﬀect of making crime and corruption
strategic complements.
After this introduction, Section 2 sets up the model by describing the prob-
lem of the criminal organization. Section 3 characterizes the corruption mar-
ket. In Section 4, the interaction between crime and corruption is analyzed and
the main propositions are presented. Section 5 analyzes the free-entry equilib-
rium. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing some implications
of the results obtained.
52 The model
There are n criminal organizations in the economy. These organizations com-
pete with each other on crime but are local monopsonies in the corruption
market. On the crime market (think for example of illicit drug cartels), there
is a pie to be shared and Cournot competition takes place. On the corruption
market, there is a continuum of judges to bribe for each of the n criminal orga-
nizations. As this will become clear below, crime is global whereas corruption
is local.
Let us ﬁrst describe the proﬁt function. For each criminal organization,
the revenue from criminal activities depends on the number of crimes and the
size of the booty per crime. The cost is given by the wage bill accruing the
criminals and the bribes paid to avoid conviction when crimes are detected.
For the criminal organization i =1 ,...,n,p r o ﬁts are given by:
π(C,Ci,α)=B (C)Ci − wiLi − Ti (1)
where
C =
j=n X
j=1
Cj
is the total number of crimes perpetrated in the economy, Ci denotes the num-
ber of crimes committed by organization i, B (C) is the booty per crime for all
criminal organizations, with B0(C) < 0 (the booty per crime B(C)i sa s s u m e d
to decrease as the number of crimes increases), wi, which is determined below,
denotes the wage paid by each criminal organization i to their Li employed
criminals, and Ti are the total costs to bribe judges borne by the criminal or-
ganization i, also to be explicitly determined below. For simplicity, we assume
linear crime proﬁtability and technology, with B(C)=B − C and Ci = Li.
Let us determine the wage wi. Those supplying labor are risk neutral. The
participation constraint for a given criminal working for organization i is given
by:
φ[wi − (αi.0+( 1− αi)S)] + (1 − φ)wi ≥ w0 (2)
where 0 < φ < 1 is the probability of detection of a crime, αi denotes the
probability that a judge is corrupted by organization i, S>0i st h es a n c t i o n
6when punishment of detected crime is enforced and w0 > 0 is the outside legal
wage for individuals not engaged in criminal activities. In equation (2), the
left hand side gives the expected gain of a criminal. Indeed, if he/she is not
caught (with probability 1 − φ), he/she gets wi. If he/she is caught (with
probability φ), he/she still obtains wi (we assume that criminals get their
wage even when they are caught) but might be convicted and punished. In
particular, if the judge is bribed by organization i (with probability αi), the
criminal is not sanctioned whereas if the judge is not bribed by organization
i (with probability 1 − αi), the criminal faces sanction S (this represents, for
example, the number of years in prison). This is a key incentive for a criminal
to join organized crime. Apart from getting wi independently of detection,
he/she beneﬁts from not being punished by sanction S even if caught when
assigned to a judge in the payroll of organization i.
In equilibrium, this constraint is binding since there is no incentive for the
criminal group to pay more than the outside wage. Therefore, the reservation
wage for which workers accept to commit crime for organization i is equal to:
wi = φS(1 − αi)+w0 (3)
Interestingly, in equilibrium, this wage will be determined by the level of
corruption αi in each organization since the higher the level of corruption,
the lower is the risk premium commanded by criminals. Indeed, if the risk of
conviction for a criminal is low, then, as long as wi is greater than w0 (which
is always the case; see (3)), there is no need to pay a much higher wage.
3 Corruption
The interaction between criminal organizations and judges is modeled here by
means of a monopsonistic competitive market inspired by Salop (1979). For
that, we consider n local markets (for example regions or local areas); each of
them is described by the circumference of a circle which has length 1. In each
local market, there is one criminal organization and a continuum of judges uni-
formly distributed on the circumference of the circle; the density is constant
and equal to 1. Without loss of generality, organization i’s (= 1,...n)l o c a t i o n
is normalized to 0. The space in which each criminal organization and judges
are located is interpreted as the “transaction cost” space. As a result, criminal
7organizations compete with each other on crime, i.e. crime is global,w h e r e a s
they only bribe judges locally, i.e. corruption is local. This means that, if a
criminal belonging to organization i is caught, he/she will be prosecuted by a
judge located in market i. In other words, all criminals commit crime in a com-
mon market but criminals belonging to diﬀerent organizations are prosecuted
in distinct markets. For example, for crimes related to narcotics distribution,
drug cartels deal illicit substances across many diﬀerent geographic markets
but criminals are prosecuted in the jurisdiction where their cartel operations
originate.
Contrary to the standard spatial model (Salop, 1979), the horizontal diﬀer-
entiation of judges takes place from the point of view of criminal organizations.
In other words, the latter are paying all the transaction costs needed to bribe
a judge (i.e. “delivery costs” accrue to the buyer). From the judge’s point of
view, there is no diﬀerentiation since they will accept a bribe if and only if their
expected gain is greater than their current wage. As a result, the “distance”
o faj u d g et oac r i m i n a lo r g a n i z a t i o nr e ﬂects the transaction cost necessary
to agree on a bribe. As social network formation may be based on regional,
ethnic or religious aﬃnity, closeness between gang leaders and law enforcers
along any of these dimensions facilitates bribing. If we take the geographic
example of Italy, it is easier for a criminal organization originating in Sicily to
bribe a judge located in Palermo than in Milan because it has more contacts
with locals who speak the same dialect. In the model, judges’ location types
are denoted by x. The more distant, the higher the transaction cost to bribe a
judge. The transaction cost function between a criminal organization located
in 0 and a judge x is t|x|,w h e r et expresses the transaction cost per unit of
distance in the location space. We assume that the outside option for judges
is their current wage wb, as corrupt law enforcers caught accepting bribes lose
their jobs.
In this paper, we focus on non-covered corruption markets, i.e. markets in
which some of the judges do not accept bribes and are thus not corrupted. We
believe it is much more realistic than a covered market in which all judges will
be corrupted in equilibrium. This means that each criminal organization acts
as a local monopsony on the corruption market whereas they will compete a
la Cournot on the crime market. Denote by xi the boundary of the segment
corresponding to each monopsonist i. This implies that each criminal organi-
8zation will bribe 2xi judges in equilibrium. Since each criminal organization is
alone in its corruption market, we have to check that xi < 1/2, ∀i =1 ,...,n,
so that, in equilibrium, the corruption market is not covered. Observe that,
even if the prosecution and thus the corruption are local, the probability to be
prosecuted by a corrupted judge is never 1. Indeed, when a criminal belonging
to organization i is caught, one knows that he/she will be judged in local mar-
ket i b u td o e sn o tk n o wt h ej u d g et ow h i c ht h ec a s ei st ob ea s s i g n e d .T h i si s
why the probability to be prosecuted by a corrupted judge in region i is 2xi,
which is by assumption strictly less than 1.
All judges are risk neutral. The participation constraint for a judge who is
bribed by a criminal organization i located at a distance xi is thus given by
(1 − q)(f + wb) ≥ wb
where q is the probability that corruption is caught (quite naturally, we assume
that if a judge is caught, he/she loses his/her wage wb)a n df is the bribe given
to the judge. Observe that f is not indexed by i since on the corruption market
each criminal organization has total monopsony power and thus ﬁxes a bribe
that just binds the judge’s participation constraint. The latter only depends
on q and wb. Once again, the left hand side gives the expected beneﬁtf r o m
corruption whereas the right hand side describes the opportunity cost. The
sanction for corruption is the loss of the job and the bribe. As a result, for
each organization i =1 ,...,n the bribe necessary to corrupt a judge is given
by
f =
q
1 − q
wb (4)
As stated above, all judges are identical so that at f they will always
accept a bribe. We could have assumed that the bribe is f +ε,w h e r eε is very
small but positive; this would obviously not change our results so whenever
judges are indiﬀerent they accept to be bribed. However, from the criminal
organization’s point of view each judge is not located at the same “distance”
so that the transaction cost to bribe a judge is diﬀerent from one judge to
another. Since xi is the maximum “distance” acceptable for each criminal
organization i (i.e. beyond xi the transaction cost of bribing a judge is too
high), then the total transaction costs for each criminal organization i is given
9by:4
Ti =2
Z xi
0
(f + t)xdx =( f + t)x
2
i
In this context, since the length of the circumference of the circle is normalized
to 1, the probability αi (the fraction of law enforcers that will be bribed in
equilibrium by paying to each of them a bribe f)i sg i v e nb yαi =2 xi/1=2 xi.
Taking into account all the elements (in particular the participation con-
straint of each criminal (3) and the participation constraint of each judge),
and using (1), the proﬁt function of a criminal organization can be written as:
π(C,Ci,f)=
Ã
B −
j=n X
j=1
Cj
!
Ci − [φS (1 − 2xi)+w0]Ci − (f + t)x
2
i (5)
This proﬁt function of each criminal organization is divided in three parts.
The ﬁrst one is the proceeds from crime, which depends on the competition
in the crime market between the diﬀerent crime organizations. The second
corresponds to the salary costs of hiring criminals while the third part denotes
the costs of bribing judges. From this reduced form, the link between crime
and corruption can be seen. While the marginal cost of bribing is increasing,
corruption reduces the unit cost per crime as the wage risk premium paid to
criminals falls.
4 Crime and corruption
As stated above, criminal organizations compete on both crime and corrup-
tion. On the crime market, each criminal organization i competes a la Cournot
by determining the optimal Ci. On the corruption market, each acts as local
monopsonist by determining the optimal xi (indeed, they have to determine
4If we take a geographical interpretation, then the total cost (f + t)x of bribing a judge
located at a distance x from a criminal organization is as follows. The criminal organization
h a st o“ t r a v e l ”ad i s t a n c ex,a tac o s tt per unit of distance, to see the judge and then has to
bribe him/her, at a cost f per unit of distance, i.e. the cost of bribing a judge depends on the
physical distance between this judge and the criminal organization. In fact, we assume that
there is a perfect correlation between the physical distance and the bribe distance between
a criminal organization and a judge, even though the cost per unit of distance is diﬀerent,
i.e. t 6= f.
10the maximum distance xi beyond which it is not proﬁtable corrupting a judge).
Because, in this model, judges are basically belong to the payroll of criminal
organizations, the choices of Ci and xi are simultaneous. Thus, choosing simul-
taneously Ci and xi (observe that there is a one-to-one relationship between xi
and αi) that maximize the proﬁt (5) yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:
B −
j=n X
j=1
Cj − Ci − [φS (1 − 2xi)+w0]=0 ( 6 )
2φSCi − 2(f + t)xi =0 ( 7 )
Using the Hessian matrix, it is easy to verify that the proﬁt function (5) is
strictly concave (implying a unique maximum) if and only if:
f + t>2(φS)
2 (8)
Let us now focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which Ci = Cj = C∗ and
xi = xj = x∗ for all i 6= j with 1≤ i ≤ n and 1≤ j ≤ n.T h e ﬁrst order
conditions are now given by:
B − (n +1 ) C
∗ = φS (1 − 2x
∗)+w0 (9)
φSC
∗ =( f + t)x
∗ (10)
Now, from (9) we obtain
C
∗ =
B − w0 − φS (1 − 2x∗)
n +1
(11)
Plugging (11) into (10) yields
x
∗ =
φS (B − w0 − φS)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 (12)
Then, by plugging (12) into (11), we have
C
∗ =
(f + t)(B − w0 − φS)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 (13)
We have ﬁnally the following result.
11Proposition 1 Assume
φS<min
·p
(f + t)/2,B− w0,
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
¸
(14)
Then, there is a unique equilibrium C∗ and α∗ =2 x∗,w h e r et h en u m b e r
of crimes per criminal organization C∗ is given by (13) and the measure of
corrupted judges per criminal organization α∗ =2 x∗ by (12). Both of them
are strictly positive and (1 − α∗)n judges are not corrupted in equilibrium.
M o r e o v e r ,t h ee q u i l i b r i u mp r o ﬁt of each criminal organization is given by
π
∗(n)=
(f + t)(B − w0 − φS)
2 (f + t − (φS)
2)
[(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2]
2 > 0 (15)
and the wage paid to each criminal is equal to
w
∗(n)=φS
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2φS (B − w0)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 + w0 >w 0 (16)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following comments are in order. First, condition (14) guarantees that
both C∗ and x∗ are strictly positive and that the solution of the maximization
problem is unique. Condition (14) also ensures that, in equilibrium, some
judges are not corrupted (i.e. x∗ < 1/2). Indeed, the diﬀerence between the
booty B and the wage of an individual having a regular job (i.e. working in
the “legal” sector) has to be large enough to induce criminal organizations to
hire criminals and to bribe judges. At the same time, this diﬀerence has to be
bounded above otherwise all judges will be corrupted because the proﬁtability
per crime would be so large to yield a corner solution in bribing. Second, when
choosing C∗ the optimal number of criminals to hire, each criminal organization
faces two opposite eﬀects. When it increases C, the proceeds from crime
are higher (positive loot eﬀect) but the competition will be ﬁercer (negative
competition eﬀect) and the wage bill higher (negative salary eﬀect). As a result,
choosing the optimal C∗ results from a trade-oﬀ between theﬁrst positive eﬀect
and the second and third negative eﬀects. This trade-oﬀ is reﬂe c t e di nt h eﬁrst
order condition (9). Finally, when choosing x∗ the level of corruption, each
criminal organization only faces two eﬀects (there is no competition since each
criminal organization acts as a monopsonist in its corruption market). Indeed,
when it increases x, lower payments to criminals increase proﬁts by saving in
12wages (positive salary eﬀect) since criminals have less risk to be sentenced but
the costs of bribing judges rise (negative bribe eﬀect). This trade-oﬀ is reﬂected
in the ﬁrst order condition (10).
At this stage, it is important to question the timing of the model in which
the choices of Ci and xi are simultaneous, implying that some judges are
basically permanent employees of criminal organizations. Another possibility
would have been that criminal organizations commit crimes ﬁrst, and then,
when detected, invest resources to bribe the judge to which the case has been
assigned. In that case, the timing would have been that Ci is chosen ﬁrst and
then xi is decided. It is easy to verify that using this timing, we would have
obtained exactly the same results as using the simultaneous choice timing, i.e.
C∗ and x∗ will still be given by (13) and (12). This is because in both cases
crime does not have strategic eﬀects on corruption, i.e. C−i (crimes committed
by all other competing organizations but i)h a sn oe ﬀect on xi (see equation
(7)). However, if the timing was to choose ﬁrst xi and then Ci,i ti se a s yt o
verify that Ci would depend both on xi and x−i, and, in this case, the results
would drastically change. But, with this timing, the economic interpretation
does not make very much sense since it implies that criminal organizations
would decide on corruption before even committing crime.
It is now interesting to analyze the properties of the equilibrium. We have
a ﬁrst simple result.
Proposition 2 Assume (14). Then,
(i) When f the cost of bribing judges, t the unit transaction cost of bribing
judges or n the number of criminal organizations increases, then both crime
and corruption decrease.
(ii) When the maximum net proceeds per crime B−w0 increases, then both
crime and corruption increase.
Proof. Straightforward from calculations.
Not surprisingly, both increasing the direct and transaction costs of bribing
judges (f and t) lead to less crime and to less corruption. Moreover, raising the
number of criminal organizations n also decreases crime and corruption because
competition in the crime market becomes ﬁercer and lower proﬁtability feeds
back to the corruption market. In particular, the incentives to bribe fall with
13competition and when the proﬁtability per crime increases independently of
n, then obviously crime and corruption increase.
Let us go further in the analysis. Deﬁne
(φS)
CSX
1 ≡
(f + t)(n +1 )−
p
(f + t)(n +1 )
p
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(B − w0)2
2(B − w0)
and
(φS)
CSC
1 ≡ B − w0 −
p
(B − w0)2 − (f + t)(n +1 ) /2
The following proposition gives our main results.5
Proposition 3 Assume (14). Then,
(i) If (B − w0)2 ≤ 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2, increasing sanctions always
reduces crime. However, for small values of φS, increasing sanctions in-
creases corruption. But for values of φS larger than (φS)CSX
1 ,i n c r e a s i n g
sanctions decreases corruption.
(ii) If 2(f + t)(n +1) 2/(n +2) 2 < (B − w0)2 ≤ (f +t)(n +2) 2/8,i n c r e a s i n g
sanctions monotonically reduces crime and increases corruption.
(iii) If (B−w0)2 > (f+t)(n+2)2/8, increasing sanctions always increases cor-
ruption. However, for small values of φS, increasing sanctions reduces
crime. But for values of φS larger than (φS)CSC
1 , increasing sanctions
increases crime. This implies that, above a threshold value of φS, rising
sanctions increase both crime and corruption.
Proof. See Kugler, Verdier and Zenou (2003).
Using Figures 1a, 1b and 1c that illustrate Proposition 3, we can give the
intuition of the main results. When (B − w0)2 ≤ 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2,
in relative terms, we have that the labor productivity w0 is high, the proceeds
per crime B are low, the probability for a corrupted judge of getting caught
q as well as his/her wage wb are high (see (4)), and the transaction costs
per distance unit t to bribe judges are large. From Figure 1a, in this case,
5The technical counterpart of Proposition 3 is Proposition 7, which is given in the Ap-
pendix.
14increasing φ the probability that a criminal is caught (e.g. enhancing frequency
of crime detection by policemen in the region) and S the sanctions (e.g. tougher
punishment upon conviction) always reduce crime.
Yet, corruption can in fact increase for low values of φS and decrease for
high values of φS. The intuition runs as follows. When B − w0 is quite low
compared to f and t, productivity in the legal sector is high, implying the
need of high payoﬀs to compensate criminals, and the revenue per crime are
low compared to the high costs of bribing judges. Moreover, it is easy to see
that the negative competition eﬀect and the positive loot eﬀect are not aﬀected
by a variation of φS whereas the negative salary eﬀect is aﬀected since it
b e c o m e se v e nm o r ec o s t l yt oh i r ec r i m i n a l s ,a st h e yh a v eah i g h e rr i s ko fb e i n g
caught. So, when φS increases, each criminal organization ﬁnds it optimal
to reduce crime, or more exactly the number of criminals hired, because the
costs of hiring criminals relatively rise. In the corruption market, when φS
increases, the positive salary eﬀect yields incentives to intensify corruption
since it becomes more costly to hire criminals whereas the negative bribe eﬀect
is not aﬀected since the cost of bribing law enforcers is independent of φS.
This can easily be seen in (10) since the left hand side corresponds to the
salary eﬀect (which depends on φS) and the right hand side to the bribe eﬀect
(which does not depends on φS). In fact, diﬀerentiating the left hand side of
(10) with respect to φS yields: C∗ +( φS)∂C∗/∂(φS). The ﬁrst eﬀect C∗ is
positive (i.e. for a given level of crime, as φS rises, each criminal organization
increases the level of corruption to induce people to become criminal) whereas
the second one (φS)∂C∗/∂(φS) is negative (i.e. as φS rises, there is less crime
and thus there is less incentive to bribe so that corruption decreases). As a
result for low values of φS, with proﬁt-maximizing crime C∗ relatively high, if
φS increases, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second eﬀect leading to increased
bribing. For high values of φS, with proﬁt-maximizing crime C∗ relatively low,
if φS increases, the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one because the crime level
C∗ is relatively low and it is optimal for criminal organizations to bribe less.
When 2(f +t)(n+1) 2/(n+2) 2 < (B −w0)2 ≤ (f +t)(n+2) 2/8, sanctions
aﬀect monotonically both crime and corruption. In this intermediate case, the
maximum proﬁts per crime also bounded above but are higher. As n rises
the lower bound depends only on the costs of bribing while the upper bound
is a term increasing both with bribing costs and the number of competing
15criminal organizations. In this case, when φS increases, proﬁt-maximizing
crime falls while corruption rises. This is an example of a situation in which
bribing dilutes deterrence but does not oﬀset it (see e.g., Polinsky and Shavell,
2001). In the previous case, corruption also mitigated deterrence but only for
relatively small φ and S. With both suﬃciently intense policing and tough
sanctions, bribery has not diluting eﬀect on deterrence policies. Figure 1b
illustrates this case.
Let us now interpret the case when (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8. In
this case, revenue per crime is suﬃciently high relative to productivity in
the legal sector so that the squared diﬀerence exceeds the upper bound of
the previous case. In this case, when φS increases, it is always optimal for
criminal organizations to increase corruption because the resulting gain from
the reduction of the criminal wage always is greater than the rise in cost of
bribing law enforcers, which is not aﬀected by φS. In contrast, the proﬁt-
maximizing level of crime this is nonmonotonic with respect to φS.I n d e e d ,
as stated above, only the salary eﬀects for both crime and corruption are
aﬀected by φS. From equation (11), we verify that the sign of ∂C∗/∂(φS)
depends on −(1−2x∗)+2φS∂x∗/∂(φS). As we assume non-covered corruption
markets where x∗ < 1/2, the ﬁrst term −(1 − 2x∗) is always negative (i.e. for
a given level of corruption, when φS increases, it becomes more costly to hire
criminals). The second term 2(φS)∂x∗/∂(φS) is positive and increasing on
φS (i.e. when φS increases, there is more bribing and it becomes less costly
to hire criminals since their wage risk premium is lower). For low values of
φS,t h eﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one. This is because at low levels
of corruption intensifying policing and sanctions deters crime by increasing its
expected cost. However, for high values of φS, the second eﬀect dominates the
ﬁrst one since the level corruption is quite high and thus neither policing nor
sanctioning deter crime. Proﬁt-maximizing bribing is an increasing function
of φS. In fact, beyond a threshold φS, further corruption reduces the criminal
wage enough to elicit a rise in proﬁt-maximizing crime.
This is our main result. In a jurisdiction where crime is proﬁtable relative
to legal economic opportunities, judges are badly-paid and easy to corrupt, we
ﬁnd that for crimes subject to intense policing and severe punishments, fur-
ther increasing the crime detection probability or the severity of the sanctions
results in more rather than less crime. In particular, when the expected cost of
16crime rises due to increases in the detection probability and statutory punish-
ment, the optimal response of criminal organizations to counteract deterrence
policy is to increase bribing to lower the conviction probability. If law enforcers
can be co-opted into the payroll of criminal organizations, pervasive bribing
induced by intended deterrence policies can be catalyst to a rise in crime. This
implies that, in jurisdictions with weak governance, the policy implications of
the standard crime model may not hold and instead, as our model suggests,
crime deterrence policy can only be eﬀective ensuing a substantial cut down in
corruption. In this case, a rise in φS beyond a threshold can take the model
into a region of the parameter space where crime and corruption are strategic
complements, as long as the equilibrium bribe is bounded.
It is interesting to compare our result with that of Malik’s (1990). In
his model, individuals engage in socially costly activities that reduce their
probability of being caught and ﬁned. This is comparable to corruption in our
model. His main ﬁnding is to show that it is not necessarily optimal to set ﬁnes
for oﬀe n s e sa sh i g ha sp o s s i b l e . T h i sh a st h es a m eﬂavor as our result (iii)
in Proposition 3. There are however important diﬀerences between the two
models. First, contrary to us, Malik (1990) adopts a normative perspective.
He focuses on an enforcement agency that aims at reducing the social costs of
avoidance activities by increasing ﬁnes. In our analysis, there is no such an
agency. There is instead competition between criminal organizations. In our
model, we can conduct positive analyses but cannot make statements about
eﬃciency. Our results are comparative statics results. If one compares two
equilibria with diﬀerent levels of sanctions, then the one with the highest level
of sanctions is not necessarily the one with the lowest levels of crime and
corruption. Second, his main result is driven by the fact that individuals are
heterogeneous ex ante in their earning abilities. In our model, all agents are
identical ex ante and our main result is driven by the imperfect competition
in the crime and corruption markets, and the fact that crime and corruption
are strategic complements. The mechanism that leads to the results, and their
nature, is thus quite diﬀerent in the two models.
[Insert Figures 1a,1ba n d1ch e r e ]
We can analyze further the potentially counterproductive eﬀect of intended
17deterrence policies by investigating case (iii) in Proposition 3. We have the
following result:
Proposition 4 Assume (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8 and (14). Then (i)
the lower the labor productivity w0 in the legal sector, (ii) the higher the booty
B per crime, (iii) the easier it is to bribe law enforcers (i.e. the lower the
reservation bribe f and associated transaction cost t), and/or (iv) the weaker
is the competition between criminal organizations (i.e. the lower is n), the
lower is the threshold of φS above which crime and corruption become strategic
complements, i.e. the more likely that an increase in policing or sanctions leads
to an increase in crime.
Proof. Straightforward from calculations.
This proposition complements our previous results. It helps explain why in
some countries deterrence works, even if diluted by corruption, while in others
i tc a nh a v ep e r v e r s ee ﬀects. The proposition establishes that in jurisdictions
where productivity is quite low in the legal sector, bribing is pervasive, and
criminal organizations have high market power, then increasing policing and
sanctions is more likely to trigger strategic complementarity among corruption
and crime resulting in a perverse eﬀect of deterrence.
This result contrasts with the literature that has posited optimal maximal
sanctions. First, Polinsky and Shavell (1979) show that if ﬁne collection is
costless and monitoring of criminal activity is costly, the optimal magnitude of
ﬁnes corresponds to the maximum payable by criminals. When this maximum
falls well short of the booty from crime, nonmonetary sanctions are required
for deterrence. Since it is not only costly to apprehend criminals but also
to punish them, Shavell (1987) proves that it is optimal for sanctions to be
imposed with low frequency. Hence, in the case that the courts’ information
is imperfect, deterrence requires suﬃciently large sanctions. The standard
result is that under risk neutrality ﬁnes should be maximal. But, if criminals
are risk averse, maximal ﬁnes are not best for deterrence.6 T h ep r e s e n c eo f
6Polinsky and Shavell (2000) present the standard case with risk neutrality (p.50) and
then discuss other reasons why maximal ﬁnes may not be optimal (pp. 62-64). First,
marginal deterrence may dictate heterogenous ﬁnes across criminal acts socially harmful in
diﬀerent degrees. Second, the potential for general enforcement investments yields economies
18corruption in Polinsky and Shavell (2001) always dictates higher sanctions to
counter the deterrence-diluting eﬀects of corruption. To the extent that there
is perfect competition in criminal activities, rises in expected costs always act
as deterrents. In contrast, in our model with imperfect competition, until
bribery can be eradicated, the intensifying policing and punishment beyond a
threshold worsens the corruption and crime problems.
5 Free entry
It is natural to ask what happens to main results derived so far with the model
if we allow for free entry. In our model, this entails that we investigate the
formation of criminal organizations, given that each of them creates their own
“local” corruption market. We would thus like characterize the number of
criminal organizations that will be created in a given country.
Each criminal organization that enters the crime and corruption markets
must pay a positive ﬁxed cost G. To determine the number of criminal orga-
nizations ne we have to solve: π∗(ne) − G =0 ,w h e r eπ∗(n) is given by (15).
We easily obtain:7
Proposition 5 If
φS<min
hp
(f + t)/2,B− w0
i
(17)
and
s
G
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤ < min
·
B − w0 − φS
f + t − 2(φS)2,
1
2φS
¸
(18)
Then, under free entry, the equilibrium number of criminal organizations is
given by:
n
e =
1
f + t

(B − w0 − φS)
s
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤
G
−
£
(f + t) − 2(φS)
2¤


(19)
of scope in monitoring inducing apprehension probabilities consistent with deterrence for
sanction magnitudes below the maximal level.
7The superscript e indicates equilibrium variables under free entry.
19The equilibrium number of criminals and corruption are respectively equal to:
C
e =
s
G(f + t)
f + t − (φS)
2 (20)
x
e = φS
s
G
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤ (21)
In this case, increasing sanctions always increases the crime and corruption
level per organization, i.e.
∂Ce
∂ (φS)
> 0 and
∂xe
∂ (φS)
> 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following comments are in order. First, as in the case with a ﬁxed
number of criminal organizations, condition (17) guarantees that Ce and xe
are strictly positive and unique. Condition (18) guarantees that ne is strictly
positive and that, at the free entry equilibrium, the market is not covered,
i.e. some judges are not corrupted. In order for a free-entry crime market to
remain consistent with non-covered corruption markets, it has to be that the
free-entry ﬁxed cost G is bounded above. The intuition runs as follows. When
the ﬁxed cost G increases, there are less criminal organizations in the economy
so less competition for crime. This implies that crime, corruption and proﬁts
per criminal organization increase. As a result, for the corruption market not
to be covered, i.e. xe < 1/2, it has to be that G is suﬃciently low to rule
out a corner solution with maximal bribing. Similarly, for ne to be positive,
whereby entry takes place in equilibrium, it has to be that G is suﬃciently low.
These two conditions are expressed in (18). Second, when there is free entry,
the number of criminal organizations ne, the crime and corruption level per
criminal organization, Ce and xe, are respectively given by (19), (20) and (21).
It is easy to verify that both Ce and xe increase with sanctions φS.I n d e e d ,
when sanctions increase, the competition in the crime market is reduced and
thus Ce and xe increase. However, this is does not necessarily increase the
total level of crime neCe and corruption 2nexe in the economy. We would like
now to verify when our previous result established in Proposition 3 (iii), both
higher crime and corruption in the wake of rises in policing and/or sanctions,
is still valid with entry. The following proposition shows that it is still true
under some conditions on parameters.
20Proposition 6 If
max
·
1
2
p
f + t,
f + t
B − w0
¸
< φS<
p
(f + t)/2 (22)
and
f + t − (φS)
2
φS
£
3(f + t) − 2(φS)
2¤ <
s
G
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤ < min
·
B − w0 − φS
f + t − 2(φS)2,
1
2(φS)
¸
(23)
then, under free entry, increasing sanctions increase the total levels of both
crime and corruption in the economy, i.e.
∂ (neCe)
∂ (φS)
> 0 and
∂ (2nexe)
∂ (φS)
> 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition shows that increasing sanctions can increase both the to-
tal levels of crime and corruption in the economy if (23) holds, i.e. the ﬁxed
cost G has to be bounded above and below. Indeed, as in Proposition 5, the
ﬁxed cost has to be suﬃciently low for the market not to be covered and for
criminal organizations to enter the market. But, a higher ﬁxed cost G gen-
erates market power for incumbent criminal organizations thereby increasing
the proﬁt-maximizing levels of crime and corruption Ce and xe.H e n c e ,w i t h
free entry, only for a suﬃciently high G is it possible that rises policing and
sanctions exacerbate corruption and crime. Indeed, a low ﬁxed cost G implies
stiﬀ competition and a relatively high ne, and an increase in φS would reduce
ne. In this case, each criminal organization raises its level of corruption xe
and hires more criminals but the global eﬀect can be lower total crime neCe
because there are less criminal organizations in the economy. If, on the con-
trary, G is not too low, competition in the crime market is limited. Prevailing
competition mitigates the rise in crime per organization to oﬀset the fall in the
number of organizations. Then, the exit eﬀect that reduces aggregate crime in
the wake of introducing deterrence policies is dominated by the rise in crime
per organization as bribing takes oﬀ.I ns u c hc a s e ,intended deterrence policies
can become catalysts to increase crime.
216C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has spelled out the role of corruption and imperfect competition
in preventing the justice system to work eﬃciently. Indeed, in a model where
criminal organizations compete a la Cournot on the crime market and act as
local monopsonists on the corruption market, we have showed that when brib-
ing costs are small relative to crime proﬁtability, beyond a threshold further
policing and sanctions lead to higher rather than lower crime.
We agree with Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973), Polinsky and Shavell (1979)
and Levitt (1998) that enhancing enforcement eﬃciency and sanction severity
in order to increase expected punishment, thereby reducing criminal activity,
is important. However, when dealing with organized crime that engages in cor-
ruption to manipulate conviction probabilities, complementary measures, such
as crack down on corruption or the institutionalization of checks and balances,
are warranted to control the problem.8 Our model delivers stark conclusions
with respect to the relationship between crime and corruption and as to why
the standard “crime and punishment” framework may fail for some countries.
When corruption is pervasive, further eﬀorts to inﬂict tougher sentences on
criminals will just raise the rents to organized crime. More generally the en-
forcement of property rights at large can break down once the police force
and courts stop functioning properly. Beyond a threshold further policing and
sanctions can be a catalyst to corruption in the justice system. As crime and
corruption become strategic complements, increasing returns in various types
of crimes may take oﬀ. This observation may explain crime dynamics in some
countries (e.g. Colombia and Russia) or regions within countries (e.g. Sicily
in Italy). Once this process starts, the best policy may be to contain diﬀusion
of corruption by organized crime to neighboring jurisdictions. Before it starts,
the best policy may be to try to suppress organized crime rents. In terms
of policy formulation, this insight is related to the Lucas (1976) critique. To
evaluate the eﬀect of a policy change, we need to incorporate in the analysis
potential adjustments in the behavior of agents in response to the new policy.
The intended outcome from crime deterrence measures may not materialize if
8See e.g., Kugler and Rosenthal (2004) for an analysis about separation of powers in
Colombia on the importance of checks and balances to buttress the legal system in an
environment with weak governance.
22the policy regime change leads criminals to intensify corruption.
Given the complementarity between crime and corruption, and since build-
ing the required institutions for a transparent legal system can take a long time
to achieve, tolerating some degree of illegality (or of a socially harmful activity
which is legalized) can be desirable if it helps to destroy the rents of organized
crime. It is interesting to observe that, in the 1920’s, after prohibition was
introduced in the United States, organized crime did have police, judges and
politicians in its payroll. In this period of time, increased police monitoring
and investigation of alcohol distribution, as well as further laws against it, only
increased the rents of the business for both traﬃckers and corrupt “enforcers”.
On the one hand, in some sense, severe sanctions on alcohol consumption
sowed the seeds for very powerful cartels. On the other hand, the destruction
of rents through legalization had a lasting eﬀect in weakening the inﬂuence
of organized crime on the legal system, which had facilitated all kinds of ille-
gal subsidiary operations by the Maﬁa, including the intense use violence for
establishing new turfs and racketeering rings.
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25APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
First, by assuming that f + t>2(φS)2 (see (14)), we guarantee that: (i)
the second order condition (8) is always true, (ii)( f +t)(n+1)> 2(φS)2.A sa
result, (ii) implies that the denominator of C∗ and x∗ are both strictly positive
and that the equilibrium proﬁt π∗(n) given by (15) and the equilibrium wage
w∗(n) given by (16) are both strictly positive.
Second, using (12) and (13), it is easy to see that C∗ > 0a n dx∗ > 0a r e
equivalent to B − w0 > φS.T h i si sg u a r a n t e e db y( 1 4 ) .
Third, because we consider the case of local monopsonists, we have to check
that in equilibrium some judges will not be corrupted (i.e. the market is not
covered). The market is not covered iﬀ x∗ < 1/2. Using (12), this writes:
φS (B − w0 − φS)
(f + t)(n +1 )− 2(φS)2 <
1
2
which is equivalent to
φS<
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
This is the third part in the bracket in (14).
Finally, to calculate the equilibrium proﬁt and the equilibrium criminal’s
wage, it suﬃces to plug (12) and (13) into (5) and (3).
Proposition 7
(i) When (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 , ∀φS<B− w0
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 ,i fφS<(φS)
CSX
1 <B− w0
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 ,i f(φS)
CSX
1 < φS<B− w0
26(ii) When (f + t)/2 < (B − w0)2 ≤ 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 , ∀φS<
p
(f + t)/2
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 ,i fφS<(φS)
CSX
1 <
p
(f + t)/2
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 ,i f(φS)
CSX
1 < φS<
p
(f + t)/2
(iii) When 2(f + t)(n +1 ) 2/(n +2 ) 2 < (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 and
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 , ∀φS<
p
(f + t)/2
(iv) When (f + t)(n +2 ) 2/8 < (B − w0)2 ≤ (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 ,i fφS<(φS)
CSC
1 <
p
(f + t)/2
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 ,i f(φS)
CSC
1 < φS<
p
(f + t)/2
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 , ∀φS<
p
(f + t)/2
(v) When (B − w0)2 > (f + t)(n +1 ) 2/2,
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
< 0 ,i fφS<(φS)
CSC
1 <
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
∂C∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 ,i f(φS)
CSC
1 < φS<
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
∂x∗
∂ (φS)
> 0 , ∀φS<
(f + t)(n +1 )
2(B − w0)
Proof. See Kugler, Verdier and Zenou (2003).
Proof of Proposition 5
27To calculate n∗,i ts u ﬃces to solve π∗(n) − G =0 ,w h e r eπ∗(n)i sg i v e nb y
(15). We easily obtain (19).
We have then to study the sign of n∗. Because of (14), 2(φS)2−(f +t) < 0.
Thus, n∗ > 0 if and only if
(B − w0 − φS)
s
(f + t)(f + t − (φS)
2)
G
> (f + t) − 2(φS)
2
which is equivalent to
s
G
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤ <
B − w0 − φS
f + t − 2(φS)2
which is the ﬁrst part of (18).
To calculate the equilibrium values of Ce and xe,i ts u ﬃces to plug n∗,
which is given by (19) in (13) and (12) respectively.
We also have to check that, at the free-entry equilibrium, the market is not
covered, i.e. xe < 1/2. Using (21), we easily obtain
s
G
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤ <
1
2(φS)
which is the second part of (18).
Finally, by diﬀerentiating (20) and (21), we easily obtain:
∂Ce
∂ (φS)
= φS
s
(f + t)G
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤3 > 0
∂xe
∂ (φS)
=
s
(f + t)G
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤3 > 0
Proof of Proposition 6
First, by diﬀerentiating (19), (20) and (21), we obtain:
(f + t)
∂n∗
∂ (φS)
=4 ( φS) −
s
(f + t)
£
f + t − (φS)
2¤
G
·
1+
φS (B − w0 − φS)
f + t − (φS)
2
¸
28∂Ce
∂ (φS)
=
(f + t)φS
£
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Second, we would like to see how the total level of crime n∗C∗ and corrup-
tion 2n∗x∗ are aﬀected by φS.W eh a v e :
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As a result,
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Similarly, we have:
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which is always positive using (22). Thus,
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We need that this result holds under conditions (17) and (18), which are
given by:
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Let us start with condition (18). Denote by
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This is (23). We thus need to check that D<min[A,E]. We have:
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31This is part of condition (22). Observe that B−w0 > (f + t)/(φS) implies
that B − w0 > φS since f + t>2(φS)
2.
Let us now check if condition (17) holds. Because B − w0 > (f + t)/(φS)
implies that B − w0 > φS, it is easy to see that condition (17) is included in
(22).
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